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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED( ON APPEAL
The sole issue for decision in this appeal is whether
the six-year statute of limitations contained in Utah's Product
Liability Act (now declared unconstitutiohal) was the applicable
period of limitation in which this action had to be brought.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a product liability action filed by plaintiff
for damages resulting from the death of hi[s wife when their Saab
automobile was destroyed in a fire.

The action was filed over

two years from the date of the accident,fc^utless than six years
from the date of sale of the automobile,

Defendants filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment claiming the Wrongful death statute
of limitations applied to the case and tide case should be dismissed. The trial court found that the product liability statute
was the more specific statute and was therefore applicable to
this cause of action allowing plaintiff six years from the date
of sale of the automobile in which to file £n action. Subsequent
to this court's decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation,
Utah P.2d 670 (1985), wherein the product liability act was found
to be unconstitutional, defendants renewed their Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming the Product Liability Act statute of
limitations was void ab initio due to the ^ct's unconstitutionality. As such, defendants argued that the Wrongful death statute
of limitations was applicable and that pllaintiff s action was
thereby barred. The trial court granted defendants' final Motion
for Summary Judgment and plaintiff has appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ronda M. Luther Raithaus died on July 2, 1979 from
injuries sustained when the Saab automobile she and her husband
Dr. Larry Raithaus were traveling in, burst into flames after
driving off the paved highway in Little Cottonwood Canyon, R.
3-4.

The Complaint in this action was filed on November 29,

1982, claiming damages for the death of Ronda M. Luther Raithaus,
plaintiff's wife, R* 6.

The Saab automobile in question was a

1976 model, R.3, bought by Dr. Raithaus in February of 1977, R.
30, 64.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is plaintiff's position that the statute of limitations in the Utah Product Liability Act was the appropriate statute of limitations at the time this action was filed and became
a component of plaintiff's vested cause of action.

The void ab

initio doctrine applied to unconstitutional statutes should not
apply so as to deprive plaintiff of this cause of action.

ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF HAD A VESTED RIGHT TO COMMENCE A PRODUCT LIABILITY
ACTION FOR THE DEATH OF HIS WIFE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY, 1983 AND
SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL ACTS CANNOT ARBITRARILY DIVEST THAT RIGHT.
The trial court in this case made rulings based upon
the applicaDility of certain statutes of limitations in this
action. In the first ruling Judge Leary denied defendants7 motion
for judgment on the pleading holding the product liability statute
- 2 -

applied.

In the second ruling, Judge Billings held that the

Utah Product Liability Act statute of limitations requiring that
any product liability action be brought within six years of the
date of the sale of a product or ten year^ from its date of manufacture, was applicable to this case rather than the Utah Wrongful
Death statutes two year limitation, R. 50-£2. in the third ruling
Judge Rokich, dismissed plaintiff's Complaint based on defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
By finally granting defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, the trial court clearly adopted defendants' position
that under the void ab initio doctrine, this court's decision
in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, Ut&h 717 P. 2d 670, erased
the Utah Product Liability Act from the statute books as though
it had never existed.

Defendants' cited £ases such as Malan v.

Lewis, Utah 639 P.2d, 661 (1984) concluding that an unconstitutional statute can neither confer nor take away the rights of
individuals.

The difficulty with this teasoning is it stops

short of a logical and thorough analysis of the issues in this
case.

It is not sufficient to say an unconstitutional statute

can neither confer nor take away individual rights.

Clearly,

this court in its Berry decision did not anticipate an absolute
adherence to the void ab initio doctrine Would result in a construction of Berry that would abrogate individual rights and
causes of action, in the same way as the ^erry court criticized
the legislature for doing.

It is plaintiff's position that such

was not the intent of this court in Berry and a proper analysis
- 3 -

will result in this court overturning the lower court,s Summary
Judgment•
The plaintiff Dr. Raithaus had a vested right in a
strict liability cause of action for the death of his wife due
to a product defect in their Saab automobile. The cause of action
against a manufacturer for damages resulting from a defective
product is a common law cause of action.

See Hahn v. Armcor

Steel Company, Utah, 601 P.2d 152 (1979).

In addition to the

elements of the cause of action as defined under the common law,
an important component of Dr. Raithaus's vested right was the
statutory limitation period found in Utah's Product Liability
Act, Utah Code Annotated, § 78-15-3 (1953) which provided:
No action shall be brought for the recovery
of damages for personal injury, death or
damaged property more than six years after
the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of
manufacture of a product where that action
is based or arises out of . . . (b) defects
in design, inspection, testing or manufacture;
. • . (e) any other alleged defect or failure
of whatsoever kind or nature in relation to
a product.
This statutory provision contained a specific limitation in product liability actions separate and apart from the general statute
of four years covering personal injuries, Utah Code Annotated,
§ 78-12-25 see Appendix A and the general statute governing wrongful death, Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-28. See Appendix B.

In

the instant case the effect of the Product Liability Act was to
extend Dr. Raithaus's period of limitation.

The automobile he

claims as defective was first sold in February of 1977 allowing
- 4 -

him until February 1983 to file a product liability cause of
action.

The action was filed in November 1982.
This court in Berry analyzed th^ above statute of lim-

itations from its repose aspect, i.e., it^s arbitrary abrogation
of causes of action because of the unrelated nature of the date
of sale or date of manufacturer.

In Berr^ this court also found

the Act not to be severable and therefor^, declared the entire
act unconstitutional because it arbitrarily deprived individuals
of their rights in violation of Utah's open courts constitutional
provision, Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 11.

In making that

finding, this court made an important statement regarding the
effect of Art. 1, § 11:
A plain reading of § 11, however,) also establishes that framers of the constitution intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights.
A constitutional guarantee of access to the
courthouse was not intended by the founders
to be an empty gesture; individuals are also
entitled to a remedy by "due course of law"
for injuries to "person, property), or reputation."
(Supra at 675)(footnote omitted).

Little <^id this court realize

a lower court would apply the void ab initio doctrine to the
unconstitutional statute without recognizilng the clear need for
exceptions. The result arbitrarily deprive|s Dr. Raithaus of his
rights to an effective remedy without providing an alternative.
This court in Berry went one step further in emphasizing the
importance of careful analysis when it staged:
. . . once a cause of action under a particular rule of law accrues to a person by
- 5 -

virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's interest in the cause of action and
the law which is the basis for a legal action
becomes vested, and a legislative repeal of
the law cannot constitutionally divest the
injured person of the right to litigate the
cause of action to a judgment.
Supra at 676 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

It is diffi-

cult to believe that the constitution would place a limit on
the legislature against divesting individuals of their rights and
not place the same limitation on the judiciary. It is plaintiff's
position that a judicial repeal of an unconstitutional statute
of limitations which does not allow a reasonable period for those
with an underlying vested cause of action to assert the action
cannot be constitutionally valid.
The trial court completely missed the underlying policy
in this court's Berry decision.

The clear policy of Berry was

that individuals had to be allowed a reasonable time to assert
their rights in the courts of this state and the repose nature
of the Product Liability Act's statute of limitations clearly
denied that reasonable time to many persons whose rights accrued
after the repose period.

This court clearly didn't anticipate

that the statute itself also extended the period of time for
certain individuals to file causes of action based on product
liability.

It is plaintiff's position that had this court real-

ized that Implication it would clearly have held that the extended
period of time was a component of the vested and accrued legal
right of parties who had been injured prior to the decision.
The only case which plaintiff's counsel has been able
- 6 -

to find in which a court dealt with the subsequent application
of a similiar judicially voided statute of limitations is McClure
v, Middletown Hospital Association, 603 F.Supp. 1365 (E.D. Ohio
1985).

The Ohio Supreme Court in Schwan V. Riverside Methodist

Hospital, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983) found that the statute of
limitations contained in the Ohio Medicai Malpractice Act providing different periods of limitation between minors under the
age of 10 years and over the age of 10 year^ was unconstitutional.
In a later decision, Opalko v. Marvmount Hospital, Inc., 458
N.E.2d 847 (Ohio 1984) the same court ih a rather convoluted
decision determined that while its Schwan decision had found
the distinction between minors under the ^ge of 10 and over the
age of 10 to be impermissible, that decision did not strike down
the absolute four year statute of limitations as applied to minors.

The Opalko court affirmed summary judgment for the defen-

dants because the plaintiff, a minor, had failed to bring an
action within the absolute four year statute of limitations.
The McClure court in a diversity action yas likewise asked to
dismiss a malpractice claim brought under the Ohio medical malpractice Act prior to the Opalko decision.

The defendant urged

that because the court in Opalko had determined the absolute
four year statute of limitations was applicable to minors and
the fourteen year limitation previously provided for minors under
the age of 10 had been declared unconstitutional, Sarah McClure
had but four years from her birth (the datie of alleged injury)
in which to bring a malpractice action.
- 7 -

Tjhe McClure court de-

clined to apply the Ohio Supreme Court cases retroactively and
reasoned as follow:
We do not believe that Sarah McClure's malpractice claim is barred by the absolute
four year limitation enunciated in Opalko.
This conclusion is based upon the inappropriateness of retroactive application of
the Opalko decision and upon an exception
to the rule that unconstitutional statutes
are entitled6to no legal effect.
The McClure court stated two reasons for not applying the Opalko
decision retroactively:
First the void ab initio doctrine
does not apply to destroy contractual rights
which have arisen or vested rights acquired
under the prior state of the law. Sarah
McClure's rights vested upon the existence
of her right to sue, that is, upon her birth.
At that time, § 2305.11(B) provided a 14year limitation on Sarah McClure's exercise
of that right. The subsequent declaration
of unconstitutionality cannot divest Sarah
McClure of that right.
The second reason that the void
ab initio doctrine is inapplicable in this
case is the peculiar nature of statutes of
limitations.
Such statutes derive their
force by the mere fact of their enactment.
They do not confer or extinguish substantive
rights bat extinguish the remedy for violation
of independent substantive rights.
Id. at 1368-69 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The McClure court then concluded:
Plaintiffs are not relying on unconstitutional statutes for their creation
of rights which would not have existed but
for the enactment of unconstitutional statute.
Rather, plaintiffs merely rely upon the arbitrary fixed interval for the assertion of
previously existing rights as that fixed
interval is written. The arbitrary fixed
interval of fourteen years was initially
set by the Ohio general assembly. That in- 8 -

terval was thought to adequately protect
the interests .of Ohio citizens. Sarah McClure's action was brought well within that
interval so that defendants Cannot claim
surprise at being called upon |to defend against her claim.
Id.
The McClure court relied on a earlier Ohio Supreme
Court decision, Cook v. Matveis, 383 N.$.2d, 608 (Ohio 1978).
The Cook court dealing with the applicable limitation period
applied to a minor after the state had amended its age of minority
from 21 to 18, held that an amended statute of limitation which
totally obliterates an existing substantive right is unconstitutional but an amended statute of limitation which provides a
reasonable time in which the right may fce enforced after the
amendment, can be constitutionally justified.

The Cook court

spent considerable effort debunking the m^th of a substantive/
procedural dichotomy in the application of retroactive statutes.
The Cook court concluded that a remedy is not a remedy where
there is not a reasonable time to enforce itj: and further held that
the statutory limitation period on a cause of action is an important substantive component of any cause o|f action.

Certainly,

application of judicial rules, whether Written or common law
cannot be applied in contravention of constitutional guarantees
or to arbitrarily deprive individuals of previously vested rights
any more than legislative enactments can.

In the instant case

the defense is asking the judicial system tto abrogate Dr. Raithaus's previously vested right based on the decision in Berry.
However, Berry instructed the legislature that under our state
- 9 -

constitution, the legislature did not have such authority.

The

irony of the defendants' reliance on Berry shows the absurdity
of its position.

CONCLUSION
It is important that this court declare that while
the Berry decision struck down Utah's Product Liability Act as
unconstitutional and that Act is now void ab initio there is one
important exception.

For causes of action accruing prior to

the Berry decision where the statute extended the time for filing
an action based on product liability beyond either the two year
wrongful death general statute of limitations or the four year
tort general statute of limitations, the extended statute of
limitations in the product liability act became a vested component
of the accrued causes of action prior to this court's decision
in Berry v. Beech and may be brought within that extended limitation period.
DATED this ^C ^

day of June, 198 6.

of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Larry Raithaus, M.D.lll
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